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One criticism of plea bargaining holds that: "So long as
defendants routinely expect to receive some form of sentencing
consideration in exchange for an admission of guilt, the essence of a
system of bargain justice is present."'
Taken as a criticism-that "bargain justice" is defective justice
and that the "routine" upon which it depends should be significantly
reduced, or eliminated-this view is quite mistaken.
On the
assumption (which I believe to be true, but for which I do not argue
here) that a large majority of the criminally accused2 are in reality
guilty, many-and probably most-criminal defendants should plead
guilty. Any defendant who discharges this duty should receive
favorable sentencing consideration. This is not a matter of offering a
carrot or threatening a stick to do what would ideally be unnecessary,
or a tactical concession in order to wrest a quota of dispositions from
reluctant defendants. It is an entirely proper element of sentencing,
even a right of the pleading defendant. In short, I argue that
* Gerard V. Bradley is a Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame. He is
the author of Church-State Relationships in America (1987) and the co-editor of
Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism: The Catholic Intellectual Traditionaland
the Moral Foundationsof Democracy (1995).
1. Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Justice," L. & Soc'Y REV. 509,
512 (1979).
2. By "criminally accused" I mean someone charged by a prosecuting authority, not
all those arrested or charged by the police.

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:65

defendants (most of whom are, in reality, guilty) should "routinely"
plead guilty, and receive a reduced sentence when they do.
Here is how I have organized the argument. In Parts I, and II,
and III, I defend the view that the common good, particularly the
principles and norms which justify and shape punishment of criminals,
not only allows, but requires favorable consideration of the pleading
defendant. That is, a sound view of crime and punishment includes
favorable consideration of the defendant who pleads guilty. Then, I
explore the question: when does the common good call for a trial,
even where the defendant is, in reality, guilty?3 Part IV anticipates
and meets one leading objection to plea bargaining in general, and to
my account of its moral supports. Part V meets others.
I consider in Part VI the defendant's point of view. Defendants
have reasons to plead, or to go to trial, which are outside the common
good of political society. For these reasons, many guilty defendants
properly go to trial. Who are these defendants? How should they be
treated by the sentencing judge? Specifically, should they receive the
consideration given to the pleading defendant, because, like the
pleading defendant, defendants who go to trial thereby serve the
common good, or do what they ought to do, all things considered?
Finally, I briefly c6nsider the implications of my analysis for the
conduct of criminal defense attorneys.
I.

THE SECONDARY AIMS OF PUNISHMENT

One of the traditional aims of criminal punishment-the moral
reform of the criminal-has been obscured, perhaps displaced, in our
therapeutic culture by a commitment to what is commonly call'ed
"rehabilitation." This contemporary notion includes some minimum
sense of the traditional idea: "rehabilitation" refers to shaping the
convicted person into a law-abiding citizen, just as, loosely speaking,
does moral reform.4 But "rehabilitation," as it is commonly
understood, is either the project of eliminating (through treatment
and other interventions) the pathologies which are thought to "cause"
crime. Or "rehabilitation" is deterrence: somehow getting the
3. In no case does the innocent defendant have an obligation to plead guilty.
Indeed, no innocent defendant may, morally speaking, plead guilty where doing so
requires him or her to speak untruthfully. On the view that "Alford" or nolo pleas involve
no such false utterances, some innocent defendants may uprightly plead guilty.
4. "Rehabilitation" is a worthwhile objective within a correctional facility for
prisoners who suffer from some treatable psychological or psychiatric disorder. But it is
not an aim of punishment; it is an element of humane care for those in custody.
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convicted person to appreciate the unpleasant consequences of
breaking the law, and so refrain out of self-interest from breaking the
law. In this latter sense of rehabilitation, public authority says to the
convicted criminal: "make a prudent calculation of your behavior
once you leave here, and you will see that it is in your interest to keep
within the bounds set by the law." In either case-deterrence or
rehabilitation as behavior modification-the aim is loaded with
notions of diminished responsibility: but for the underlying pathology
or the criminal's almost childlike incapacity to link today with
tomorrow, the convicted criminal would not have behaved badly. The
predominant presupposition is that it is sick or stupid to commit a
crime.
But it is not irrational (sick or stupid) to commit crimes, though
some sick or stupid people do. Crime is an attractive choice, and
people of average intelligence and normal functioning can and do
commit crimes.
Moral reform, traditionally understood as something tantamount
to conversion, is quite a different thing. (Recall that custodial
institutions were once called "penitentiaries" or "reformatories.")
The aim of punishment is precisely that-punishment. Punishment is
possible only where the criminal is taken to be a free actor, someone
who has consciously and voluntarily preferred his own interests above
those of other people in society Punishment can make no sense in a
therapeutic culture, where criminal justice is seen as regrettable, or as
something necessary to maintain social hygiene. Additionally, moral
reform is easily distinguished from deterrence, which is finally an
appeal to enlightened self-interest, not to norms of fairness to others.
Moral reform is about the defendant's character as a free and thus
responsible acting person.
II. THE CENTRAL AIM OF PUNISHMENT

The traditional understanding of crime and punishment ought to
be abandoned if it is in fact true that people are either always, or
characteristically, incapable of free choice. Thus, the conclusions of
5. We seem, as a society, to be leaving behind the once common notion that poverty
causes crime. See Leonard J. Long, Optimum Poverty, Character,and the Non-Relevance
of Poverty Law, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 693, 708-09 (1994) (citing Roy M. Howsen &
Stephen B. Jerrell, Some Determinants of Property Crime: Economic Factors Influence
CriminalBehavior But Cannot Completely Explain the Syndrome, 46 AM. J. ECON. & SOC.
445 (1987)). In its central sense this view probably holds that criminal acts are rational, but
also that they are reasonable, even good. In this view, punishment is unwarranted, and
therefore an oppressive imposition.
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Richard Posner, and many others, that people are cause and effect all
the way down, and that we still usefully (uprightly) retain the
language and practices of punishment, must be rejected as, at best,
noble lies and, at worst, ruling class propaganda.6 Still, the fact that
criminal acts are often performed by people with diminished
capacities, and in situations where freedom is compromised, are
conclusions perfectly compatible with the traditional understanding of
punishment and with contemporary institutions rooted in that
understanding. Also, rehabilitation and deterrence are permissible
secondary considerations in a sound regime of crime and punishment,7
but they are not really the central or justifying aim of punishment.
Neither is moral reform, in the straightforward sense of
improving the defendant's character. Public authority is not justified
in coercing an individual simply because the individual would benefit
from it, even if we could be certain that the individual's character
would be improved by the intervention. But the presuppositions of
this secondary aim are pretty much those of the justifying aim of
punishment. Clarifying that aim, a matter to which I now turn, will
allow us to see how a defendant's willingness to plead guilty entitles
him to a sentence reduction.
The essential (but not exclusive) moral wrong in criminal
behavior is the selfish (i.e., unfair) grab of more freedom than is one's
due, more than others enjoy by virtue of their continuing to stay
within the law. In suffering punishment, which is the unwelcome
deprivation of the liberty to do as one pleases, criminals lose their
undeserved advantage over law-abiding citizens.
To better appreciate the central aim of punishment, one should
hold in the mind's eye a diachronic view of society's interaction, a
broad pattern of restraint, action, and opportunity; one established by
custom, morality; and finally, by law. Public authority administers
punishment so that, over a period of time, no one is made a "sucker"
by choosing to remain within the law's path for pursuing one's
projects in cooperation with others. Liberty is a valuable (and
important) common resource. The law consists, in the relevant view
of liberty, as a pattern of distribution of this valuable resource. Once
this pattern is established by the persons or institutions responsible for
such matters, the individual citizen's adherence to law is a matter of
6. See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Overcoming Posner, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1898,
1920-22 (1996) (book review) (discussing Posner's theories on punishment).
7. See Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 414 (1992);
Mathew A. Paulsey, The Jurisprudenceof Crime and Punishment from Plato to Hegel, 39
AM. J. JURIS. 97, 98-99 (1994).
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fairness to others who would, like that individual, prefer a greater
amount of liberty.
Fairness, especially insofar as it requires treating similarly
situated people in the same way, has a great deal to do with
determining a just punishment. Fairness, however, is not the only
criterion. Fairness is one very important element of the common
good. But the more inclusive common good, not fairness, is the
principle of legitimate public authority, including its exercise in
administering punishments. Cases of immunity and pardons-for
diplomats, legislators during session, sitting presidents-are justified
by reference to the common good, even if otherwise letting such
persons "get away with it" is unfair. Short of such wholesale
exceptions from criminal liability, a variety of evidentiary privileges
(priest-penitent, doctor-patient) makes it practically difficult to
prosecute certain types of offenses. I am not sure whether
prosecuting to the detriment of values protected by.these crosscutting
norms is "unfair." It seems more appropriate to say that, while it
would be fair and presumptively in the interest of society to prosecute
a particular case, the common good is better served if we do not. John
Finnis says that "if it is unfair to law-abiding citizens not to punish
criminals, it is more unfair to them to punish criminals when it is clear
that the punishment will lead to more crime, more unfairness by
criminals and more danger and disadvantage to law-abiding citizens."8
By bringing the central wrong of criminal misbehavior into focus,
we can recover the sense of some of our settled convictions about
crime and punishment. Most important among these is the distinction
between civil and criminal wrongs. Why do the "People" (or the
"State" or the "Commonwealth") prosecute assault charges in
addition to, or instead of, a civil suit by the injured party? Why-on
what basis-does the political community prosecute as crimes acts
that do not harm anyone in particular? (For almost no one is opposed
to prosecuting all so-called victimless crimes-all prostitution, drug,
and other "quality of life" offenses. That is, almost everyone favors
the prosecution of some activities which harm no one other than the
perpetrator in his character.)
Everyone is treated unfairly by the criminal: the criminal
unilaterally claims a greater liberty to pursue his own path than all
those who choose to remain within the bounds of the law. So the
"People" are the aggrieved party in criminal prosecutions. By
keeping the central wrong of criminal misbehavior in mind, we can
8.

John Finnis, The Restoration of Retribution,32 ANALYSIS 131, 135 (1972).
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see the justice of prosecuting some "victimless crimes," too. On the
assumptions that the legally prohibited conduct is not morally
required of anyone and that the common good of political society
includes some public moral ecology,9 once a law concerning a
victimless crime is enacted, then it is at least presumptively unfair for
anyone to unilaterally decide to ignore it. The law-abiding members
of the community, who may have as much or greater inclination and
interest in performing the illegal act than the criminal, are
victimized-made "suckers" and treated unfairly-by the miscreant.
Punishment aims to restore a just-that is, fair-distribution of
liberty. The precise restorative property of punishment is to make the
criminal "pay his debt to society," by being made to suffer some
deprivation. Though punishment might take different forms, what is
"going on," morally speaking, in any case is the defendant's will is
being pushed back, debited, constricted beyond that of other lawabiding people. And so the admonition "go and sin no more"-no
imposition now, but stay within the law henceforth-is not a gentle
punishment, but a second chance-an act of mercy. The admonition
is no punishment at all.
The privation must be the act of the political community; its aim
must be to set the ledger (of restraint, opportunity, liberty) straight.
We might loosely say that if John Gotti dies in prison today he will get
what he deserves, but, he will in fact have avoided just punishment.
Natural evil is not punishment; though, in certain cases, it might
properly mitigate punishment otherwise deserved. Or, again speaking
loosely, we might, say that a bombing suspect beaten by the police
officers who apprehended him, or fatally shot during their hot pursuit
of him, got his "just desserts." Not really. Only a representative
vested with public authority to punish can inflict punishment, as
opposed to mere pain, suffering, or privation.
Punishment is not logically tied to any particular form or kind of
unwelcome imposition. How criminals should be punished-both as
to kinds of deprivations imposed upon them and as to the extent of
imposition of any one kind-is entirely a matter of specification, save
that the scale of punishments should exhibit a rough coherence:
larceny should be *punished less severely than murder, etc. As far as
natural justice is concerned, in no case is this or that precise
punishment the only correct one. There is no calculation by which it
could be established that a reduction in severity, due to a plea, is
wrong unless the plea is not relevant to the sentencing decision.
9.

That is, some substantive conception of public morality.
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Opponents of plea bargaining seem to suppose just that. However, in
the next section, I argue the opposite.
Reasonable judges will differ on the proper punishment for a
particular offender. This range is properly limited, when it is limited,
by specifying legislation."° Even so, insofar as criticisms, like the one
quoted at the opening of this paper, suppose that there is, as a matter
of justice, a "correct" sentence from which a judge deviates in
conceding something to the pleading defendant, this view
misapprehends the moral truth of the matter.

III. THE PLEADING DEFENDANT
The pleading defendant sets himself on the path to moral reform.
By accepting responsibility for his actions, he cements his status as
one who recognizes the basic ends of the law of crime and
punishment. Besides his contribution to restoring justice by his
incipient moral reform, the pleading defendant earns some relief from
the deterrent component of sentencing, at least that aspect called
"specific deterrence." Specific deterrence is basically a promise to this
defendant that crime does not pay. By pleading and accepting his
punishment, the defendant indicates his assent to that proposition.
Specific deterrence and moral reform-two of the secondary aims
of punishment-are favorably served by the pleading defendant. If
these ends are proper elements in figuring the precise terms of a
particular sentence, as I think they are," then the pleading defendant
would be treated unfairly if he received the same sentence as
someone, otherwise like him, who was convicted after trial.
The pleading defendant also acts directly for the benefit of many
individuals. In so doing, he further evidences a changing character-a
change for the better. He relieves witnesses of a duty to testify,
especially where a witness is subject to humiliation (a victim of sexual
misconduct), abuse (a robbery victim aggressively cross-examined), or
even danger (testifying against the mob chieftain).
Often his
punishment includes some act (restitution, for example) which directly
10. See Hon. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr. et al., Does New York's Death Penalty Statute
Violate The New York Constitution?, 14 TOURo L. REV. 715, 734 (1998); see generally
Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case For Eighth Amendment Regulation of the CapitalSentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1998) (advocating that the Eighth Amendment
places restrictions on who is subject to the death penalty).
11. I do not offer here a full account of how the secondary ends of punishmentdeterrence and moral reform-are to be integrated into the final sentence. I do not have
such a theory, but I am convinced that any sound theory will allow for sentencing
variations of some dissension, according to the secondary aims at stake.
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benefits, if it does not make whole, his victim. The collateral effect of
the criminal conviction is to reduce any parallel civil action to a
hearing on damages. In many cases, the defendant's plea eliminates
the temptation that full dress trials hold to many participants to act
unethically: the defense lawyer faces no dilemmas about perjured
testimony, and witnesses all around are not tempted to perjure
themselves. This temptation is often as great for police witnesses
against the defendant as it is for, say, alibi witnesses he might summon
to help exculpate him.
Moreover, the pleading defendant acts for the common good, and
not merely for the benefit of specified individuals. How so?
The criminal justice system-the vast institutional apparatus
centered on the courthouse, populated by lawyers, judges, probation
officers and attended by police officers, lab technicians, coroners, and
civilian witnesses-is a vastly expensive, scarce community resource.
(I do not here refer to the corrections system or to the lawmaking
activities which create and sustain a system of crime and punishment.)
This scarce resource is created by the community for the limited but
important purpose of fairly and accurately adjudicating accusations of
criminal misconduct. Since it is a scarce resource, duties of fairness in
its utilization arise: all those who have a say in how this scarce
resource is used-including the criminal defendant"2 -have moral
duties concerning how the resource is used. It makes no practical
difference that one thinks the system is understaffed and
underfunded. Duties of fairness arise, like it or not, from the fixed
quantity of resources available, no matter what that quantity is.13
This duty of fairness runs first of all to other defendants,
especially to those for whom trials are morally necessary-innocent
defendants. But even other defendants who are inclined to plead
guilty have significant needs for the attention of defense counsel,
prosecutors, judges, and other court personnel. All these persons'
ability to give other pleading defendants the attention they deserve is
limited by the number of cases tried. In the time it takes to try one
felony, perhaps hundreds of plea negotiations can be conducted.
The defendant has the legal liberty to plead not guilty, to force
the political community to prove its case against him, and thus to
12. The claim that defendants have a moral duty to promote the common good, the
discharge of which favorably affects sentencing, will probably strike anyone like Posner as
absurd.
13. I leave aside, without judging it, the possibility of demonstrating the injustice of a
court system or of some law by resolving to demand trials in all cases-exactly to paralyze
the system.
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subject various individuals to greater or lesser inconvenience. The
defendant is neither obliged to explain his plea of not guilty nor is he
informed that he faces adverse legal consequences by pleading not
guilty. The defendant, in other words, is not only at liberty to
command the consumption of a scarce common resource by dint,
simply and solely, of his say so, but to impose upon many innocent
individuals.
The accused is also at liberty to act for the benefit of others,
considered both individually and as constitutive members of the
common political society. If he pleads guilty, he permits the scarce
resources he would otherwise cause to be consumed to be devoted to
the causes of others who might have cases more deserving of trial, or
who have other reasonable claims upon their attention. By freeing all
the institutional actors concerned with his case-his lawyer, the judge,
the prosecutor, police witnesses-to tend to other duties of various
sorts, the pleading defendant acts indirectly, but effectively, for the
benefit of the whole community.
Further, the defendant who pleads guilty acts for the common
good and anticipates some of his punishment by placing resources that
the community has placed at his disposal, at the disposal of others.
Put differently, he freely declines to exercise his legal liberty to
consume these scarce resources. He gives back to the community,
which he treated unfairly by committing a crime, one scarce
resource-the criminal justice system-in lieu of his unfair diversion
to himself of another scarce resource-liberty.
The earmark of punishment is restoration of a balance (across the
members of society) of restraint within the bounds of law. The
defendant needs to have his will imposed upon (a matter to which we
shall turn momentarily), but punishment does not entail useless
privation. In fact, common usefulness should be an aspiration of the
sentencing judge. Hence, community service is an element of a
criminal's punishment.
IV. OBJECrIONS
The most plausible objection to reducing the pleading
defendant's sentence is, it seems to me, that it gives to the defendant
too much say over what his punishment shall be. The idea is that
punishment should not be chosen by the defendant, that he must be
made to suffer some unwelcome privation, and so pay his debt to
society. The objection seems, or sounds like, it is right: one should not
be at liberty to choose one's own punishment. But, exactly, why not?
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I think the main danger is that the person to be punished might
choose something which appears to be a privation to outsiders, but
which actually pleases, or does not displease, him. The misbehaving
child, given a choice by an inattentive parent, might choose to give up
Nintendo for a week as punishment for missing curfew. But, unknown
to the parent, the child is sick of Nintendo, or sees that because of
basketball practice and schoolwork, he would not have time to play
Nintendo anyway, or the child simply welcomes the free time, which
he expects to fill with other pleasurable activities.
I concede it is unwise to let children choose, willy nilly, their own
punishments. But it might be wise to let them choose from two or
more activities of the parent's choice, for this reason: the choice gives
the errant child a limited opportunity to embrace the punishment and
shape his character around the moral goodness of being punished.
That is to be encouraged. We should want a person who is punished
to accept (and, in that sense, to embrace) the moral correctness of the
punishment.
To get back to the case of the pleading defendant. He does not
choose, willy nilly, his punishment. The options, including the
opportunity to plead guilty and its consequences, are shaped by
factors other than his will. The objective question is whether the plea
is an opportunity to serve the common good and to relieve lawabiding citizens from (some of) their sucker status. (And so it is
unlike good "private" acts the defendant might do to evidence
improved character, such as visiting his ailing mom, or resuming his
child support payments.
These good acts should not affect
sentencing.) Once the objective question is settled, if the defendant
accepts (embraces) his punishment, all the better. Consider one effect
of denying this view: the defendant who positively embraces his
imprisonment, in the sense of seeing its value and who willingly
submits to it, and makes the best of it, is beyond punishment
altogether. The Bird Man of Alcatraz, or a jailhouse lawyer or
minister, or any other prisoner who makes a useful, even good, life
behind bars would never be able to pay his debt to society, precisely
because he becomes good.
V.

MORE OBJECrIONS

One more objection has to do with what might be called the
"intransitive" effect of jury service. The idea is that there is intrinsic
value-educational, mainly-to jurors in being jurors. I do not deny
that there is such value in jury service, though I deny the assertion by
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Yale Law School's Akhil Amar, for example, that the intransitive
value rivals, and perhaps outweighs, the transitive value of jury
service. 4 I deny, that is, that the experience and good effects of being
a juror are in any way a close competitor, when it comes to evaluating
the usefulness of jury trials, to the conscientious performance of the
jury's adjudicative function-verdicts founded upon the law and the
evidence. Jurors may sometimes behave as members of a New
England town meeting, and be better for having done so, but all such
effects should be seen as incidental by-products of the jurors'
adjudicative function.
Having denied the independent significance of these
"intransitive" benefits, I am not sure what is left of the objection that,
however particularly stated, presupposes that resolution by a jury
verdict is, somehow, the norm or standard or ideal resolution of a
criminal lawsuit.
In my experience, this standard is usually
presupposed; it is rarely defended explicitly. But what is to be said in
its defense? There is surely no logical relation between everyone
having a legal right to a jury trial and everyone actually having a jury
trial. The criticism can get aloft only by identifying some number of
trials or units of jury service as... necessary? Optimal? Desirable?
In no plausible scenario growing out of what I here propose will the
number of jury trials be negligible. And, once the transitive value of
jury trials is seen as the determining criterion in considering their
overall utility, it becomes an entirely open question whether juries get
it right more often than the alternative.
But what is that alternative? On what basis, other than
overvaluation of intransitive effects or a dreamy prejudice in favor of
jury trials, is the jury preferable to a scheme (like mine) that identifies
a substantial class of guilty defendants who ought to plead guilty? My
guess is that the appeal to the jury norm (again, apart from
intransitivity) is covertly a function of what I treat in Part V: a
disagreement about just what class of defendants ought to plead.
The next objection is that plea bargaining, of which the
defendant's willingness to plead is an essential part, gives the
prosecutor too much power. This objection is comprised of two
different claims, and one of them has two related aspects. To take the
complex claim first, the charge seems to be that prosecutors have, in a
system characterized by guilty pleas, too much to say about the
14. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
173-74 (1997) (explaining that the "deepest constitutional function" of juries is not to serve
the parties, but to serve "the people" by "involving them in the administration of justice").
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defendant's eventual sentence and, for that reason, the prosecutor
invades the province of other institutional branches, foremost the
judiciary.
It is certainly the case that, in a regime of developed
classifications of crimes accompanied by determinate sentencing,
prosecutors have a great deal of power. By offering to reduce a top
count of murder, for instance, which might carry a mandatory
minimum of fifteen years, to manslaughter, which carries a minimum
of two years, a prosecutor constrains a sentencing judge's options and
offers a defendant a powerful incentive to plead. Or, a prosecutor
might charge a felony and accept a plea to a misdemeanor, or accept a
plea to a felony, which carries no mandatory prison time where a
higher degree felony, with mandatory incarceration, was charged. But
is this to say that the prosecutor possesses too much power, or that he
is a usurper, or both?
With important ethical side-constraints which I state below, the
answer is no. For one thing, the argument may prove too much. The
prosecutor's discretion to charge or not, and what to charge, is an
ineradicable aspect of executive authority as it is generally understood
in our constitutional system, as is the pardon (at least for chief
executives), and (with limited exceptions) the decision to immunize a
witness. (Think of the consequences of Ken Starr's decision to
immunize Monica Lewinsky.) No way to significantly limit all this
discretion is at hand; a statute to command prosecution of "all
offenses without exception" is unworkable, and a directive to charge
the highest provable crime does not avoid prosecutorial judgment
calls: what is the highest provable crime? Constraints with more
modest ambitions, such as those requiring a plea to, say, a felony no
more than one classification lower than that charged, may blunt much
of the force of the "prosecutors-have-too-much-power" criticism.
Is the prosecutor a usurper? The legislature invests great
authority (and, yes, great leverage) in the prosecutor by setting up a
classification scheme in which the sentencing differences between
adjacent classes of crimes are great. There may be a usurpation
argument here, though I doubt it. But if there is an argument, it is an
argument against the legislative branch. By granting a host of
debatable assumptions, it might be argued that some proper discretion
of judges has been legislatively transferred to prosecutors. Again, I do
not think so. In any event, much of the prosecutor's leverage over
sentencing is a function of judicial eagerness to impose sentences
which the prosecutor is not heard to oppose.
The proper limitations upon the prosecutor's power must, it
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seems to me, be ethical. The first constraint is familiar to anyone who
has seen a standard code of professional responsibility: in no case
whatsoever shall a prosecutor accept a plea from a defendant whom
the prosecutor does not believe is, in reality, guilty. The second
constraint arises from the whole complex of ethical considerations we
have been examining, and I can only give a general expression to it
here: plea offers ought to be consistent with viewing the guilty plea as
an opportunity for the defendant to act for the good of others. Plea
offers should, therefore, move within a range inhabited by the "good
man," and ought to steer clear of offers that even an indifferent
defendant would accept. Nothing the prosecutor does can insure that,
even within the acceptable range, defendants accept offers for good
reasons rather than bad.
However, the prosecutor can give
defendants a chance to be good. I do not exclude a radically different
approach to plea bargaining; call it the market approach. The right
plea offer is simply that which, given the constraints within which the
actors operate, suffices to secure a disposition. This approach may be
justifiable, but not on the basis of any argument here.
VI. WHICH CASES SHOULD BE TRIED: THE VIEW
FROM THE COMMON GOOD

The common good is always served by the trial of an innocent
defendant (at least when a guilty plea is the alternative). Besides, at
least typically, the pleading innocent would have to speak falsely in
order to gain a court's acceptance of his guilty plea. But, in what
situation is the common good served more by trial to a verdict than by
a plea of guilty, where the defendant could plead guilty without
speaking falsely?
In many criminal trials, the jury reaches a decision that amounts
to more than the termination of one lawsuit but amounts to interstitial
lawmaking.
"Reasonable force," "negligent infliction," and
"unreasonable noise" are moral evaluative terms in the criminal law.
They are specified by the jurors. Over time, such provisions are
hammered out by juries so that a kind of common law (of force, or
noise) is enacted. Since the common good is plainly served by having
some standard about these matters, trying at least some such cases is
good. The same is true for other justification and excuse cases.
Some defendants do a public service by bringing cases to trial, by
carving out, one might say, a common law of convictions. A certain
number of cases need to be tried in any given jurisdiction in order to
flesh out just what constitutes a proved case, to show what counts, in
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this place at this time, as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In one
sense, this is the line between criminal misbehavior and behavior that
is tolerated in the community. Participants in the criminal justice
process regularly, if not always consciously, have in mind the
prospects of jury conviction when they make decisions about what to
charge, how to defend a case, and whether to make, or accept, a plea
offer.
Even when the defendant is, in fact, guilty, he may be convinced,
with good reason, that he may serve the common good more
effectively by litigating the case. Examples include the following:
The defendant is in fact guilty of selling drugs and would be
willing to plead guilty, but exposing the pattern of police misconduct
in his neighborhood, which includes harassment of African-American
male youths, must be a feature of his trial. This defendant's lawyer
promises to litigate the matter fully.
The publicity which the
defendant's own testimony, along with the discovery materials secured
from the police department, may provoke the serious review of police
operations in the defendant's neighborhood that is needed.
The defendant is in fact guilty of operating a livery without a
proper hack license. But due to prevalent stereotypes, corruption,
inertia, and the greed of others, there is no available taxi service in his
minority neighborhood.
The defendant is convinced that
nonenforcement of this ordinance would serve the common good, and
he has reason to believe that a jury drawn from a true cross section of
the community will not convict him, no matter what the evidence of
his violation of the positive law is. He hopes to help decriminalize this
valuable service.
The defendant is in fact guilty of trespassing at an abortion clinic,
but, like the civil rights demonstrators of the preceding generation, he
believed that the positive law that he has admittedly broken is unjust.
He holds out little hope that he will be acquitted but believes that
passive resistance to the unjust law, including a zealous defense of the
charges against him, serves the common good.15
There are probably many other types of cases where the
defendant and public authority, due partly to different roles, to
reasonable disagreement about certain moral evaluative matters, and
to different knowledge, have divergent views of how the defendant

15. I leave aside the question of what jurors or a judge ought to do in this case. The
example is included on the assumption either that there is a good faith possibility that
public authority considers the law to be just or that nonviolent violations of it are
counterproductive.
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may serve the common good. But, at least in certain classes of casesnotably, legislative-type verdicts-and in certain individual casesthose "sending a message," for instance-the sentencing judge should
proceed on the presumption that the trial defendant be treated as
would a defendant who pleaded guilty. I do not imagine that all such
defendants act out of concern for the common good. But the burden
should be on the prosecution to rebut the presumption that they do.
Which defendants, from the point of view of the common good,
ought to plead guilty? The central category is the large numbers of
crimes that occur when a particular defendant's guilt turns upon a
simple historical fact. Identity is the leading example. My guess is
that most criminal accusations lodged in the average jurisdiction can
conclusively be proved, by reliable evidence, to have been crimes:
someone broke into and stole this car; this death (by shooting or
asphyxiation) was surely an intentional killing; this woman was surely
beaten and raped by someone. Now, in almost all of these cases (even
where the prosecution may have no eyewitnesses), there is at least one
person who is sure of the criminal's identity: the defendant. He knows
whether he was there or not. Other cases in which the precise offense
committed' turns upon some simple historical fact: Was she sixteen
years of age? Was the stash at least a full pound of cocaine? This
class of "simple" cases is very large. Where the people's proof is all
but certain to convict, unless the defendant is a member of that class
of persons who have compelling reasons to avoid punishment, he
should plead guilty.
Add in cases in which the proper mental element is the only real
question-this defendant knows he is guilty of unlawful killing, be it
murder (as the prosecution contends) or manslaughter (as he sees
it)-and the percentage of defendants who can be sure that they are
guilty of at least one of the crimes charged, including lesser included
offenses, is probably quite large. These defendants, again from the
point of view of the common good, should plead guilty and receive
favorable sentencing consideration for doing so. Not all of the
defendants who plead will be acting. Some will. And the system
would benefit, I think, from a blanket presumption in favor of the
pleading defendant.
VII. DEFENDANTS AND NON-PUBLIC REASONS
Some defendants, for good reasons falling outside the scope of
the political common good, decline to plead guilty even though they
are guilty, and even though they fall outside the classes of cases in
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which the common good calls for a trial.
Which defendants?
Bob is, in fact, guilty of robbing a convenience store. But he has
been imprisoned before, and he knows what punishment by
imprisonment really includes. Because he is not physically powerful
and not a likely candidate for gang membership (and the security that
a gang entails), he is virtually certain to be subjected to physical
degradation, including rape, by other prisoners. Bob knows also that
while rape is common and that prison authorities are aware of its
prevalence, they do nothing about it: no prisoner at Stateville Prison
has ever been charged by prosecutors with rape; prison discipline is
rarely, if ever, imposed for that crime; and segregation from the other
prisoners is possible only by authority of the warden. However, the
warden thinks that being sodomized is an inevitable aspect of
imprisonment. His stated attitude is that Bob, and others like him,
should refrain from criminal activity if they are so averse to the
conditions of confinement. Anyway, the warden has not the facilities
for isolating all the victims of rape. His policy is not to isolate anyone,
unless there are particular aggravating circumstances (the victim is
needed as a witness in another case, is due to be released soon, has
connections, or is being beaten, too). Bob concludes that, because no
such circumstances are present in his case, that he need not submit to
imprisonment on these terms, and that he should do what he can,
short of acts wrong in themselves, to avoid such "punishment."16
Every defendant has some reason to avoid imprisonment and,
perhaps, lesser types of punishment as well. While many defendants
may have constricted their activities mainly to hanging out with
unsavory associates and to exploiting others, no one is devoted
entirely to such worthless pursuits. Virtually every defendant has
some worthwhile friendships; many are valuable members of families
and have friends who will suffer from their imprisonment. Many have
worthwhile projects, including an education in progress, employment
of genuine value to others, and so on. Especially from the perspective
of the deprived innocent bystanders-dependents and other family
members-these losses are not properly part of punishment. They are
not the point of imprisonment.
It seems to me that a high percentage of all defendants who are,
in fact, guilty would promote the common good by pleading guilty, but
16. I do not know how deeply the exposure to such inhumane practices vitiates, at
least where there is official indifference, the moral legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
The extent might be, however, great.

1999]

PLEA BARGAINING

it seems also that virtually all defendants have good reason to avoid
imprisonment. Would not any defendant be morally justified in
seizing the chance, no matter how small, of a favorable jury verdict as
opposed to the certainty of punishment after a guilty plea? And, if so,
is this not to say that a sentencing judge should treat any defendant as
having done the right thing?
I think not. Recall that we are talking about a large class of
defendants-those who are in fact guilty and who have no colorable
defense. We are speaking then of defendants who are both deserving
of punishment (i.e., it would not be unfair to punish them) and, no
matter what defendants choose to do, are very likely to be punished.
And, note well: to say that all defendants have some reason to avoid
punishment is not to say, or imply, that all-or any-have conclusive
reasons to do so. Consider it from another view: if it were the case
that a guilty defendant had no reason to go to trial, then it would be
not only wrong, but irrational, for the guilty defendant to go to trial.
The analysis up to this point shows that, from the guilty defendant's
perspective, there are reasons----Worthwhile opportunities and projects
to be pursued, or which will be made unavailable-either way. The
question of the guilty defendant's obligation to plead guilty, then, is a
question of fairness: given the reasonable claims of others upon the
scarce resources of the criminal justice system and the burdens I
would impose to others by going to trial, is it fair for me to do so?
To ask whether it is fair for this (or that) defendant to go to trial
is to ask mainly about the application of the Golden Rule: all the
worthwhile interests and projects of all the persons affected by the
decision must be considered without arbitrary self-preference. We
have already identified at least the most salient interests and projects,
including especially the unfairness in most cases, to the entire
community of leaving the defendant's criminal acts unpunished, and
of the priority to be given within the system to cases in which the
common good is served by a trial. The case of the innocently accused
is the most important example of such cases.
My provisional judgment is that these reasons should be
considered a wash: it may be presumed that all defendants have
worthwhile reasons to remain at liberty. Being true, or presumed
true, of all, it makes for no distinction in their treatment.
VIII. THE LAWYER'S ROLE

The criminal defense lawyer acquires, if the foregoing analysis is
sound, a new two-fold duty: first, to counsel his client, with a view to
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clarifying the defendant's obligation to plead guilty, and second, (in
the relatively infrequent case) to try to explain to a sentencing judge
why a particular defendant, convicted after trial, might be deserving of
favorable treatment even though it appears that the defendant acted
selfishly in declining earlier plea offers.
The first duty includes conversational elements, which are
already standard fare, but also includes highlighting them and shifting
the center of gravity beneath the elements. Already, a defendant's
attorney strives to ascertain possible defenses (including the
possibility of actual innocence) in connection with plea negotiations.
Attorneys learn a bit about what the defendant is generally up to in
connection with bail application and sentence negotiation.
The center of gravity of existing conversations is, I expect, pretty
much the courthouse market: what the state must offer to secure that
large number of nontrial dispositions it needs to keep the system from
collapsing. The conversation instead should be centered on the
unique opportunity the defendant has to act uprightly. This does not
make the defendant's attorney a paternalistic intermeddler; only the
defendant can decide what to do. The attorney should make sure that
the defendant is aware of the morally important quality of the
decision to plead, a decision now treated, I fear, as a self-centered,
prudential calculation.
From a moral standpoint, in no case must a lawyer consider
withdrawal. Even the defendant who acts unfairly in trying a case has
a right to an acquittal if the case is not proved. The lawyer vindicates
that right.

